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PUBLIC WELFARE
N. Y. CoNs. art. XVI, § 1:
The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and
shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and
in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from
time to time determine.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
SECOND DEPARTMENT
Molloy v. Bane1
(decided October 2, 1995)
The petitioner, Barbara J. Molloy claimed that the termination
of her Medicaid benefits by the New York State Department of
Social Services [hereinafter DSS], based on the renouncement of
her intestate interest in the estate of her daughter, was improper
pursuant to section 2-1.11 of the New York Estate Powers and
Trusts Law.2 In considering the petitioner's claim, the appellate
division based its reasoning on Article XVII, section I of the
New York State Constitution.3
The court concluded that this section, which obligates the state
to provide "aid, care and support [to] the needy," 4 is limited by
the "basic premise that aid is to be furnished only to the truly
needy and the legislature enjoys great discretion to exclude from
1. 214 A.D.2d 171, 631 N.Y.S.2d 910 (2d Dep't 1995).
2. Id. at 174, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 912-13. See N.Y. EST. POWERS &
TRusTs LAw § 2-1.11(b)(1) (McKinney 1981). This section provides in
pertinent part: "Any beneficiary of a disposition may renounce all or part of
his interest.. . ." Id.
3. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. Section 1 provides: "The aid, care and
support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and
by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the
legislature may from time to time determine." Id.
4. Id.
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aid programs those individuals who have purposely created their
own need." 5 Accordingly, the court held that DSS had correctly
terminated the petitioner's benefits, pursuant to DSS regulations,
because she had failed to pursue an alternative, available
resource. 6 Thus, the court effectively denied petitioner's
constitutional claim to public assistance on the ground that she
"theoretically perpetuated her own neediness by eschewing a
potentially viable resource." 7
The petitioner moved to Florida after spending most of her life
in Suffolk County, New York. 8 In Florida, she experienced a
severe brain hemorrhage, and as a result was partially paralyzed,
restricted to a wheelchair, and could no longer speak. 9 She
returned to New York, and was eventually placed in a nursing
home located in Rockland County.10 Her receipt of Medicaid
benefits commenced in 1989.11 Two years later, petitioner's
daughter died in an automobile accident at the age of eighteen. 12
Rockland County DSS, upon learning of this incident,
requested three times that petitioner assign her intestate interest
in her daughter's estate to Rockland County DSS, because it
believed that a wrongful death suit on the daughter's behalf could
yield a monetary recovery. 13 Although petitioner did not respond
to the first two requests, she eventually filed her renunciation of
any interest in her daughter's estate with the Suffolk County
5. Molloy, 214 A.D.2d at 174, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 913. The court stated
that "[w]ho is, and who is not, needy, is determined by reference to the rules
found in, among other places, Social Services Law § 366, which governs
eligibility for medical assistance." Id. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 366
(McKinney 1992). This section provides in pertinent part: "Medical assistance
shall be given.., to a person who requires such assistance and who... is
eligible to receive federal supplemental security income payments and/or
additional state payments. . . ." Id.
6. Molloy, 214 A.D.2d at 174-75, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 172, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
9. Id. at 172, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 911-912.
10. Id. at 172, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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Surrogates Court before she received the third request.14 By
virtue of this renunciation, Rockland County DSS decided that
she had failed to act in accordance with the requirements for
Medicaid eligibility by "failing to pursue an available
resource" 15 and, therefore, she violated section 360-2.3(c)(1) of
title 18 of the Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of
the State of New York.16 Petitioner received notice from DSS of
its intent to terminate her Medicaid benefits, and she demanded
that a hearing be held. 17
At that hearing, the petitioner's representative asserted that the
petitioner's renunciation was due to the fact that she would not be
physically capable of enduring the trauma of a wrongful death
suit because she was suffering from several debilitating
illnesses. 18 Despite this assertion, New York State DSS agreed
with Rockland County DSS and determined that she was
"obligated to pursue a potential resource," and therefore had
violated the State public assistance regulations. 19 In response,
petitioner filed suit in objection to this determination.20
The Appellate Division, Second Department affirmed the
termination of the petitioner's DSS benefits. 21 Although the court
decided against the petitioner pursuant to state regulations, its
reasoning was based, in part, on the determination to limit the
scope of Article XVII, section 1 of the New York State
Constitution.22 The court stated that this constitutional provision
14. Id. at 173, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 912. The fact that the petitioner's
daughter died without a will and that the value of her estate was not discernible
when Rockland County DSS requested assignment of petitioner's intestate
share to itself is undisputed. Id. at 172-73, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
15. Id. at 173, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
16. Id. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. XVIII, § 360-2.3(c)(1)
(1983). This section provides in pertinent part: "To be eligible for [assistance],
the applicant must pursue any potential income and resources that may be
available." Id.
17. Molloy, 214 A.D.2d at 173, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 177, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 915.
22. Id. at 174, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
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confers upon the state the duty to assist the needy. 23 It explained
that Medicaid benefits are based on need, the determination of
which is outlined in state laws which set forth eligibility
requirements. 24 Thus, the constitutional issue in this case focused
upon the question of whether the application of these eligibility
requirements to the petitioner violated her constitutional right to
public assistance. 25
In considering this issue, the court emphasized that the
constitutional provision for public assistance was limited to the
"truly needy,"26 and that the legislature was entitled to deny
public assistance to persons "who have purposely created their
own need" for the aid.27 The court relied upon the reasoning in
Matter of Kircher v. Perales.28 In Kircher, the Appellate
Division, Second Department, stated that the Legislature,
pursuant to its discretion, can define the requirements for
neediness and create programs to aid the needy. 29 Thus, the court
stated that the Legislature plays a definite role in establishing the
scope of article XVII, section 1 of the New York State
Constitution, since it "may establish different criteria for
different types of assistance." 30
The court in Kircher further declared that the legislature may
withhold public assistance from "those who have purposely
23. Id. See supra note 3. See also Dan J. Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 7,
371 N.E.2d 449, 451, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 730 (1977) (stating that "[i]n New
York State, the provision for assistance to the needy is not a matter of
legislative grace; rather, it is specifically mandated by our Constitution").
24. Molloy, 214 A.D.2d at 174, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 913 (stating that
"need[iness] is determined by reference to the rules found in, among other
places, Social Services Law § 366, which governs eligibility for medical
assistance").
25. Id. at 174, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
26. Id. ("Underlying all eligibility determinations is a basic premise that
aid is to be furnished only to the truly needy. ... ").
27. Id.
28. 112 A.D.2d 431, 492 N.Y.S.2d 91 (2d Dep't 1985).
29. Id. at 433, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 94 (citing Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1,
8, 371 N.E.2d 449, 452, 400 N.Y.S.2d 728, 731 (1977)).
30. Id.
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created their own 'need' in order to qualify for assistance." 31
Therefore, the court in Molloy came to the conclusion that
"because [the petitioner] failed to pursue an available resource,"
termination of her Medicaid benefits did not violate her
constitutional right to public assistance. 32
In addition, the appellate division addressed the argument that
section 2-1.11 of the New York Estates, Powers and Trusts
Law33 gave the petitioner "an absolute right" to give up her
intestate share in her daughter's estate.34 The court rejected this
argument, and determined that the right to renounce was in no
way absolute. 35 The court stated that "EPTL 2-1.11 does not
give [the petitioner] carte blanche to renounce potential available
resources without impacting upon her eligibility" for Medicaid
assistance. 3 6 Thus, the court determined that the public policy of
limiting government aid to those who are legitimately needy
overrides a person's right to reject a gift or inheritance, and
therefore concluded that her right to renounce a gift did not
excuse her obligation to seek out an alternative resource that was
at her disposal. 37
In the instant case, although the petitioner had the right to
renounce her intestate share of a possible wrongful death
31. Id. (citing Matter of Flynn v. Bates, 67 A.D.2d 975, 976, 413
N.Y.S.2d 446, 447-48 (2d Dep't 1979) (holding that the petitioner was
prohibited from waiving her elective share in her deceased husband's estate
and then declaring that she was a needy citizen)). The Flynn court also stated
that section 366(2)(b) of the Social Services Law supports this holding. Flynn,
67 A.D.2d at 976-77, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 448.
32. Molloy, 214 A.D.2d at 176-77, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 914-15.
33. N.Y. EsT. POWERS & TRusTs LAW § 2-1.11(b)(1) (McKinney 1981).
See supra note 2.
34. Molloy, 214 A.D.2d at 175, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 913. The court
acknowledged that there is a public policy which holds that a person has a right
to refuse a gift. Id. at 174, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 913. However, the court declared
that this policy had "to be balanced against... an equally established policy
that public aid is not without limits, and one who receives public aid may not
with impunity hide assets that might otherwise be used to pay for their care."
Id.
35. Id. at 175, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
36. Id. at 176, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
37. Id.
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recovery for her deceased daughter, 38 by doing so she
perpetuated her status as a needy citizen.39 Thus, the court held
that DSS could make the determination that petitioner should be
excluded from further participation in the Medicaid program.40
Consequently, the court affirmed the limited scope of the state's
welfare provision by upholding the DSS regulations requiring the
pursuit of potential, alternative resources. 41
38. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 2-1.11(b)(1).
39. Molloy, 214 A.D.2d at 174-75, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
40. Id. at 175, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 913.
41. Id. at 177, 631 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
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